U.S. plans to begin peace talks with the Taliban led to the suspension of bilateral security talks between the U.S. and Afghanistan on June 19, 2013.   “At an extraordinary session chaired by President Hamid Karzai, the president decided to suspend talks on a security pact with the United States because of their contradictory statements and actions regarding the peace process,” spokesman Aimal Faizi told Reuters.  Secretary of State John Kerry discussed the outbreak with Mr. Karzai in phone calls on June 19, 2013, Afghan and U.S. officials said, as part of the recent round of crisis diplomacy between Washington and the curious Afghan leader.  Negotiations on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BCA) began in early 2013 and, once completed, will determine the form of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan for years to come.  Security talks between the United States. and Afghanistan would provide a limited number of military instructors and counter-terrorism forces to remain in the country. The talks were complicated by several disagreements, including over the immunity that US troops would enjoy from Afghan laws.
 Speaking to reporters a few days before the suspension, Gen. Joseph Dunford, commander of the US-led coalition, said, “The bilateral security agreement is essential to any presence after 2014. It must therefore be taken seriously on both sides.  It was not clear how long Afghan President Karzai would withdraw from security talks with the United States to finalize arrangements to maintain a small U.S. presence in the country after the withdrawal of the last NATO troops in 2014.  Taliban spokesman Mohammad Naeem claimed in a Skype interview with voA Afghanistan Service that the group had abided by the agreement. The agreement signed in Doha, Qatar, which follows more than a year of negotiations and ostensibly excludes the US-backed Afghan government, is not a final peace agreement, is full of ambiguities and could still be dissolved. As the Afghan military melted, some in Washington argued that Biden should reverse the withdrawal and launch a new offensive.
Others argued that war was a long-lasting and inexpensive affair before former President Donald Trump, and then Biden, decided to resign. However, as a result of this war, nearly 2,500 American soldiers are no longer alive to express an opinion on the subject. Nor would the immediate satisfaction of striking the Taliban again produce a plan to achieve what two decades, $2.3 trillion and a peak of 100,000 U.S. troops could not. Under both agreements, 9,800 U.S. troops and at least 2,000 NATO troops will be allowed to remain in Afghanistan after the official end of the international combat mission on December 31, 2014, while allowing for additional training and advice to Afghan security forces and counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda remnants.  Most troops will help train and support the fighting Afghan security forces, although some U.S. special forces will remain to conduct counterterrorism missions.  The NATO-led ISAF mission will transition to a Kabul-based training mission with six bases across the country.  Under the BSA, the United States is allowed to have bases at nine different locations in Afghanistan.  A base in Jalalabad, eastern Afghanistan, could also remain a starting point for armed drone operations in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan.
  The agreement also prevents the United States from prosecuting the military under Afghan law for the crimes they commit; Instead, the United States is responsible for any criminal proceedings or disciplinary action involving its troops in the country. The provision does not apply to civilian contractors.  The strength of 9,800 Americans is to be halved by 2016, with U.S. forces then stationed only in Kabul and Bagram Air Base. By the end of 2017, the U.S. force must be further reduced to what U.S. officials have called a “normal” military advisory component at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which most likely has several hundred.  The BSA comes into force on January 1, 2015 and remains in effect “until the end of 2024 and beyond,” unless both parties terminate it with two years` notice.
 India. New Delhi is a strong supporter of the Afghan government and has provided $3 billion since 2001 to develop infrastructure and maintain business in Afghanistan. Its main objectives are to minimize Pakistan`s influence and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for anti-Indian militants. The Indian government has failed to support U.S. efforts to reach an agreement with the Taliban and has refused to legitimize the group as a political actor. This was a mistake that the United States will pay for in the years to come. Two decades after 9/11, the status quo had prevailed. The Taliban insurgency was alive and well, but Afghan security forces held firm with an ever-dwindling number of U.S. and NATO troops. Then Washington lacked strategic patience. A year after announcing that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan was based on conditions rather than timelines, former President Donald Trump authorized direct talks between the U.S.
and the Taliban without the presence of the Afghan government. This fulfilled a long-standing condition of the Taliban: the willingness to talk to the Americans, but not to their puppets in Kabul. I said at the time that these talks were about American capitulation, not peace. And that`s what they were. The indelible image of this catastrophic U.S. failure will be that the U.S. Air Force`s C-17 plane will leave Kabul to take off, surrounded by an Afghan crowd desperately trying to leave the country. The damage to U.S. national security and America`s reputation will be considerable. The United States has encouraged Islamic radicals all over the world, while the Taliban produce a narrative of righteous believers beating infidels on the battlefield.
The Taliban regain control and will bring with them their al-Qaeda allies. This is not a hypothetical security threat. These are the bands that produced 9/11, and they didn`t become friendlier and softer in the meantime. At the same time, a full withdrawal will affect the capabilities of U.S. intelligence agencies and make it more difficult to identify emerging threats. On the 22nd. In September 2016, the Afghan government signed a draft peace agreement with Hezb-i-Islami. According to the draft agreement, Hezb-i-Islami agreed to end hostilities, sever ties with extremist groups and respect the Afghan constitution in exchange for the government`s recognition of the group and support for the lifting of UN and US sanctions against its leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. who had also been promised an honorary position in government.   This was the first peace treaty since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001. Government officials hailed the deal as a step toward peace and perhaps also as a deal with the Taliban.
 Others, however, have expressed concern about alleged war crimes committed by controversial leader Hekmatyar; some sections of Afghan society protested against the peace treaty because of its previous actions.  But it is seen as a step toward negotiating a broader deal, which some hope could eventually end the insurgency of the Taliban, the militant movement that once ruled Afghanistan under strict Islamic code. After nine rounds of talks, negotiators signed a peace agreement in February 2020 that addresses four main issues: All Afghan children are legally required to graduate in grade nine. .